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WHEN BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME
DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH: THE
BATTERED WOMAN AS VIGILANTE
ELISABETH AyWIDIz*
Carole Herriman's crime was grabbing a rifle and firing through
the bathroom door at her husband, a man who had raped and beaten
her with wooden two-by-fours, a man who shouted that he was going
to kill her.' Herriman did not wait for the police because she did
not believe they could get there fast enough to save her.2 A jury
convicted her of first degree murder and she is now serving a twenty-
five year to life sentence.'
It is unclear how many women are affected by domestic violence.4
While statistics on the number of battered women are alarming, they
vary wildly. The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, for
example, estimates that more than twenty-seven million women will
experience violence in their marriage and that eighteen million
women are battered repeatedly every year.' However, the National
Family Violence Survey shows that men's violence against women
decreased by forty-three percent between 1985 and 1992.6 Whether
or not the incidence of domestic violence has decreased, the National
Family Violence Study, sponsored by the National Institute of Mental
Health, estimates that 188,000 women per year are battered severely
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1. Cathryn Creno, Do 'Victims' Who Kil Deserve Relief?, A.Z. REPUB., Mar. 23, 1993, at El
(discussing a proposal which would set up a review panel to consider early release for women
convicted of killing their abusers).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Armin A. Brott, Hyped Stats on Wife Abuse Only Worsen the Problem, WASH. POST, July
31, 1994, at C1 (arguing that the various statistics estimating the annual abuse of women are
inaccurately high).
5. Id. (stating that these statistics are over-inflated estimates).
6. Id. (showing that there is a great disparity in the statistics regarding women affected by
domestic violence).
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enough to require medical attention.7 Moreover, the Federal Bureau
of Investigations (FBI) estimates that 1,400 women, about six percent
of all murders, were killed by their spouses or partners in 1992
alone.' The problem of battered women, while perhaps not accurate-
ly quantifiable, is grave.
Under a retributivist, or repaired crimes analysis, a batterer gains
unfair advantages over a woman every time he beats her; he gains
domination, power and the right to disregard laws against battery.9
Thus, a woman who kills in self-defense removes these unfairly won
advantages. "Arguing that the man's death corrects past wrongs may
seem like vigilante justice. Indeed, those arguing that battered
woman's syndrome is dangerous fear that it allows 'a private right to
impose the death penalty.'"" But is this necessarily bad? If a
"morally justified" person is one who acts after correctly evaluating all
conflicting demands,' can a woman be morally justified in killing
her batterer?
This paper first discusses battered women who kill their abusers and
Battered Woman's Syndrome ("BWS") as an element of self-defense.
Section II contends that BWS is not the justice system's only appropri-
ate response to battered women who kill. Section II argues that
battered women who kill their abusers are morally justified vigilantes.
Section III of this paper concludes that since battered women's acts
are morally justified, the justice system should encourage jury
nullification" for battered women convicted of killing their abusers.
I. BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL
In Arizona, women who kill their batterers are likely to be charged
with premeditated first-degree murder.1 A man who beats and kills
7. Id.
8. Id. (noting that not all of these murders were a result of domestic abuse. Not only
women are killed by their spouses, the FBI notes that 41% of spousal murder victims in 1992
were male.). Id.
9. SeeAlison M. Madden, Clemency For Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: Finding A Just
Forum 4 HASTINGS WOMEN's UJ. 1, 56 (1993) (arguing that since the justice system failed most
of the women in a California group petitioning for clemency, Governor Wilson should recognize
that the group does not deserve to be incarcerated). Madden's argument apparently was not
persuasive as Wilson commuted the sentence of only one of dozens of petitioners. Id. at 1-4.
10. Id. at 56.
11. Id. at 58.
12. SeeTodd Barnet, New York Considers Juy Nuffication: Informing theJury of its Common Law
Right to Decide Both Facts and Law, 65 N.Y. STATE BARJ. 40, 40 (1993) (definingjury nullification
as the power of a jury in a criminal trial to judge the facts of a case and the propriety of
applying the law set forth by the court); see also Korrach, infra note 187, at 131 (definingjury
nullification).
13. See Creno, supra note 1 (describing the abusive situations of 11 women, some of whom
are serving first-degree murder sentences in Arizona prisons for killing their abusers).
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his spouse is typically charged with unplanned second-degree
murder.'4 This disparate treatment of men and women who kill
their spouses is, according to some, the norm.15 After examining
FBI statistics, one author concluded that fewer men are charged with
first or second-degree murder for killing a woman known to them
than are women who killed a man known to them. 6 The author
also found that women often face harsher penalties than men: of the
thirty-six women studied who killed their partners, each was charged
with first-degree murder. 7 Twenty of the women received jail time,
and one received a sentence of fifty years.'
8
A woman may be justified in killing under the law of self-defense
when she has a reasonable belief in the necessity of force and the
imminence of danger 9  Many battered women who kill their
batterers, however, have had difficulty justifying their crime under
traditional self-defense laws.2° One response to the unique problem
posed by battered women who kill their abusers has been the
promulgation of BWS.21  BWS is not a defense in and of itself;
rather, it is a means to prove the reasonableness of the battered
woman's belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury.22
Expert testimony on BWS is needed to bolster a defendant's
credibility.23 Credibility is crucial because if the jury does not believe
14. See generally ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL 11 (1987) (showing that
when women kill their abusers they receive harsher sentences than men who kill their wives).
15. See Nancy Gibbs, Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 41, 42-43 (comparing the
average prison sentences for men and women who kill their mates). Women who kill their male
mates receive an average sentence of 15 to 20 years while men who kill their female mates
receive an average sentence of two to six years. Id.
16. Sandy Rovner, When Women Kill the Men Who Abuse Them, WASH. POST, Apr. 21,1987, at
ZIl (citing Angela Browne's 1984 study of FBI statistics and noting that 92% of attacked men
had arrest records and 80% drank heavily).
17. Id.
18. Id. But see Brott, supra note 4 at CI (noting that statistics obtained by the Department
ofJustice indicate that women who kill their partners get an average sentence of six years while
men who kill their partners get an average sentence of 17 years).
19. Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence: V. Battered Women WhoKill TheirAbusers, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1574,1580 (1993) (discussing
the criminal justice system's treatment of women who kill their abusers).
20. Id. at 1580.
21. See McMaugh v. Rhode Island, 612 A.2d 725 (RI. 1992) (illustrating that BWS is not
restricted to those crimes in which battered women kill their abusers). The McMaugh court
found BWS relevant where a battered woman and her abuser were charged with murdering a
third party. The court found that, as a result of BWS, the defendant was unable to participate
in the preparation of her defense independent of her husband's influence. Id. at 733. Her case
was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 734.
22. Pennsylvania v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (discussing the
relationship between BWS and the elements of self-defense).
23. See NewJersey v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (NJ. 1984) (holding that expert testimony is
relevant under NewJersey's standard of self-defense to determine the objective reasonableness
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that the battered woman reasonably feared imminent death or serious
bodily harm, it cannot find that she acted in self-defense.24 Because
of myths and stereotypes about battered women, juries may not
believe a battered woman who claims she reasonably believed she was
in danger.' Jurors, without the benefit of expert testimony, may
assume that a woman subject to vicious and severe abuse would simply
leave.2" Jurors may not understand that battered women are apt to
feel psychologically paralyzed, as if resistance is hopeless and they
have no place to go.2 Without expert testimony on BWS, jurors may
not understand the battered woman's belief that leaving Will only
cause a more vicious reprisal or that the battering is normal. The
New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
[0] nly by understanding these unique pressures that force battered
women to remain with their mates, despite their long-standing and
reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation that being
a battered woman creates, can a battered woman's state of mind be
accurately and fairly understood.'
BWS, therefore, is a lens through which jurors can understand the
hell a battered woman suffers and how this impacts the reasonable-
ness of her belief that she was in imminent danger.
Unfortunately, expert testimony on BWS is unavailable for many
battered women who kill their abusers."0 Some feminist scholars
argue that current self-defense law is unable to deal fairly with
battered women who kill because of underlying gender bias. That
of the battered woman's belief that deadly force was necessary to prevent serious bodily harm
or death). But seePennsylvania v. Miller, 634A.2d 614,620-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that
it is inappropriate to use expert testimony on BWS to bolster the defendant's credibility). The
Miller court asserted that BWS testimony should be used to aid the jury in determining the
defendant's state of mind in light of the abusive environment. Id.
24. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375 (explaining that credibility is crucial to the woman's defense as
she must convey to the jury that she truly believed she was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury).
25. Id.
26. 1d.
27. See id. at 372 (discussing the various perceptions battered women typically have of the
abusive relationship).
28. Id.
29. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
30. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1574-75 (stating that in the cases of
one hundred battered women charged with homicide, 63 of the 85 who pleaded self-defense
were convicted).
31. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1575-76 (citing CYNTHIA K.
GILLESPIE,JUSTIniALE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF DEFENSE AND THE LAW xiii (1989) as
arguing that the law of self-defense operates differently for women than for men because of
gender bias; Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of
Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 227, 230 (1986) as stating that "unfortunately
for battered women, 'classic' self-defensive action is embodied in male, stranger-to-stranger
assault.").
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is, the paradigms of self-defense law are not responsive to the
circumstances under which battered women kill. 2 As a result of the
bias inherent in the law and the myths held by society concerning
battered women, such as the "she could have just left" stereotype,
judges often exclude evidence concerning the woman's perceptions
and circumstances. 3 Moreover, even if there is not gender bias in
the law itself, some commentators argue thatjudges do not admit the
evidence of BWS because they believe it impossible that a woman who
killed her abuser acted reasonably.3 4 Thus, even where BWS should
have been available to a defendant, a judge may, in his or her
discretion, refuse to admit it.
35
Even if a judge admits evidence on BWS, a narrow interpretation
of the self-defense theory may preclude the use of BWS for some
women.3 ' There may be a technical imminency problem. While
some courts accept that imminency need not equate with immedia-
cy, 37 others have rejected evidence of BWS where the abuser was
asleep or the battered woman hired a third party to commit the
crime. Moreover, deadly force may be seen as an unreasonable
and thus unjustifiable response to a non-deadly threat.39 That is,
using deadly force against an abuser who attacks with his fists, makes
verbal threats or is sleeping may be seen as excessive and, therefore,
unreasonable. 0
32. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1574, 1576 (describing the first
paradigm as one in which a person is suddenly attacked by a stranger. In the other paradigm,
a dispute between two persons of equal size and strength escalates into a deadly situation.).
33. See generally Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1575-76, 1581 (asserting
that judges tend to believe battered women would leave batterers if they were truly frightened
and therefore exclude evidence of the womens' perceptions and circumstances when contrary
to the "reasonable" view of the judge).
34. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1581.
35. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1576.
36. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1593.
37. SeeWashington v.Janes, 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993) (holding that a threat of imminent
harm can be present where the triggering behavior and abusive episode are divided by time).
An otherwise innocuous comment occurring days before the homicide can be highly relevant
when the evidence shows that such a comment inevitably signaled an abusive episode. IkL at
506.
38. See Ex Parte Haney, 603 So.2d 412, 418 (Ala. 1992) (convicting Judy Haney of capital
murder and sentencing her to death for soliciting the murder of her abuser where the court
found that Ms. Haney was not in imminent danger of abuse because she went to her sister's
home several days before the killing actually took place); Hill v. Alabama, 507 So.2d 554 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1987) (excluding evidence of BWS where the defendant shot her abuser three times
while he was sleeping).
39. See. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1576 (explaining that in most
jurisdictions, a woman is only justified in using deadly force when she reasonably believes her
attacker is about to use, or is using, deadly force).
40. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1575-76 (discussing the unequal
treatment and results experienced by battered women who try to use self-defense law).
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A final problem with BWS is that, like self-defense law, which
generally is not applicable to battered women, BWS excludes those
women who do not fit the stereotype of a battered woman.41
Moreover, it is argued that BWS perpetuates images of women as
helpless, passive or emotionally disturbed. 2 Ironically, while BWS
should emphasize the reasonableness of a woman's behavior, it
actually connotes incapacity and insanity. Thus, BWS may be available
only for women who either fit the stereotype of the battered woman
or are willing to portray themselves as insane.4
The use of BWS as a legal defense, therefore, does not sufficiently
address the needs of all battered women who kill. It may not be a
viable option where the technical requirements of self-defense are not
met, where ajudge is influenced by myths and stereotypes, or where
a woman is unable or unwilling to present herself as anything other
than rational and reasonable.
II. THE BATTERED WOMAN AND VIGILANTISM
BWS is but one moderate reaction of the judicial system to the
plight of battered women. As discussed above, BWS may not reach far
enough to help many women. It may not express the community's
sense of outrage at the violence done to women and its sanctioning
of at last seeing justice done. Accepting the battered woman as a
vigilante is one means by which the community and justice system can
find a battered woman morally justified in killing her abuser.
Vigilante is generally interpreted as a "pejorative word, and it is
used to criticize or warn. It is a powerful word that suggests willful
violence masquerading asjustice. It is a delegitimizing term... [that
is both] a reproach and a warning."" To some, vigilantism equates
with racism.'
As with any term, however, these negative connotations are not the
only ones possible. Vigilant, for example, is an adjective with positive
41. See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1592 (explaining that courts and
defense attorneys tend to stress female passivity and incapacity instead of emphasizing how an
abused woman's actions are reasonable under self-defense law. This focus may create a situation
where expert testimony is admitted only when the battered woman fits a preconceived
stereotype.).
42. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1592.
43. Harvard Law ReviewAssociation, supra note 19, at 1592-93; Madden, supra note 9, at 48-
49 (arguing that this is especially true where the defendant is a woman who has resisted violence
in the past. Courts are unwilling to accept such defendants as "good" battered women.).
44. Kirstin S. Dodge, BashingBack: Gay and Lesbian Street Patrols and the CriminaiJusice System
11 LAW & INEQ.J. 295, 333 (1993).
45. DAvID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNtiE, AND THE ComoY: SHOULD AMERICA
ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES 529 (1992) (describing the infamous case
of Bernard Goetz, a white man who shot four black youths on a subway).
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connotations-society respects a watchdog that is ever-vigilant. A
neutral definition describes a vigilance committee as "a group of
persons organized without legal authorization professedly to keep
order and punish crime when ordinary law enforcement agencies
apparently fail to do so."46 Vigilantism is thus equated with taking
the law into one's own hands.47 In the context of battered women
who kill, vigilante should be seen as a word connoting justice and
empowerment.
A. The Battered Woman as Vigilante
The phenomenon of vigilantism has been explored from many
different angles. Several of these explications are helpful in defining
battered women as vigilantes. First, while vigilantism has historically
been related to groups," the modem vigilante is often an individual
who is seen as a defender ofjustice against the law.49 This individual
has a dual character; she is both a law-abiding hero and a law-
breaking villain.5" The battered woman embodies this dual charac-
ter. She has, often for many years, abided by the law, taking abuse
without retaliation. She has often turned to the justice system for
help, generally to no avail.5 Yet when she finally strikes and defends
herself, it is she who becomes the villain, the pariah disrupting home
and hearth. She is the murderous monster.
Second, a distinction exists between organized and spontaneous
vigilantism. That is, for some, organization is an essential part of
vigilantism while for others, vigilantism occurs when "bystanders not
only apprehend a criminal but also mete out punishment them-
selves."52 A spontaneous vigilante, thus, may be the actual or
potential victim herself.53 The battered woman is by definition a
victim, one who has not received justice, one who has not seen her
46. WEBnrER'S UNABRIDGED DIcrIoNARY 1028 (2nd ed. 1979).
47. SeeJ. Paul Grayson, Vigilantism in Canada and the United States, 16 LEGAL STUD. FORUM
21, 22 (1992) (discussing theories of vigilantism and self-defense).
48. See Timothy Lenz, Republican Virtue and the Amedican Vigilante, 12 LEGAL STUD. FORUM
117, 124 (1988) (stating that in the past, vigilantism has been associated with movements or
mobs rather than with the individual).
49. Id. at 124 (noting that the vigilante tradition has enjoyed considerable legitimacy in
American history). Five vigilantes became United States Senators, eight became state governors,
and both Andrew Jackson and Teddy Roosevelt, as presidents, supported vigilantism. Grayson,
supra note 47, at 27.
50. Lenz, supra note 48, at 129.
51. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL 10 (1987) (discussing police
responsiveness to domestic violence homicides).
52. Grayson, supra note 47, at 23.
53. See Grayson, supra note 47, at 23 (pointing out that when a potential or actual victim
responds by apprehending a criminal and meting out punishment, he or she is acting as a
spontaneous vigilante).
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batterer punished for the abuse he has heaped upon her.5 4 Thus,
by killing her batterer, the battered woman becomes a spontaneous
vigilante-she apprehends a criminal that the law has failed to bring
to justice and metes out the punishment he richly deserves.
Third, "the line between self defense and vigilantism may be seen
as both thin and negotiable."55 A vigilante, therefore, is not neces-
sarily outside of the law. Rather, a vigilante may be one who does not
wait for the state when a crime has been committed, when the "moral
order" has been ruptured.5" The battered woman should be seen as
operating within the law. Self-defense may be technically unavailable
for the battered woman due to the reasons discussed above.
7
Moreover, the battered woman has often Waited for the state to repair
the moral order and bring her abuser to justice, to no avail. Thus,
rather than continue Waiting for the state, all the while receiving
beating after beating, the battered woman, by killing her abuser,
repairs the moral order herself.
Finally, one sociologist has posited that several conditions must be
met before vigilantism emerges: 1) a violation of norms, 2) existing
law enforcement agencies and the judicial system must be deemed
unable to cope with the violation, and 3) vigilantism must be viewed
as consistent with social values. 8
For battered women, social norms have been repeatedly violated;
criminal behavior violates social norms and battery is a crime.5 9 Law
enforcement agencies are perceived as unable to cope with this
violation.' Forty-two percent of Americans in one poll responded
that they had "not very much confidence" in the ability of police to
protect them and eight percent replied that they had none at all."
54. Contra EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATERED WOMEN AS SuRvIVORS: AN
ALTERNATivE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988) (asserting that battered women are
active survivors as opposed to helpless victims); A. Renie Callahan, Will the "Real" Battered
Woman Please Stand Up? In Search of a Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM.
UJ. GENDER & L. 117 (1994) (proposing a legal characterization of battered women which
incorporates elements of learned helplessness and survivor theories).
55. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 54 at 24 (stating that those who "apprehend a criminal
and also mete out punishment need not be bystanders: they can be potential or actual victims
themselves").
56. Id
57. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text (discussing common problems faced by
women who kill their abusers and try to use BWS in a self-defense plea).
58. See Grayson, supra note 47, at 30 (discussing the conditions which are generally required
before the emergence of vigilantism).
59. See generally SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 642-44 (5th ed., Little, Brown and Company 1989) (discussing the criminal nature
of assault and battery).
60. Id.
61. See Grayson, supra note 47, at 31 (citing a 1989 Gallup poll discussing the public's
perception of the ability of police to protect them).
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For women who have been physically abused and summoned the
police to no avail,62 that number must be dramatically higher.6'
Similarly, the judicial system often fails the battered woman. While
statistics are unavailable, anecdotal evidence indicates that the
number of batterers who are ultimately held accountable for their
actions and serve time in prison is minute.' In 1990, for example,
the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts found that
domestic violence offenders do not serve any time at all!65
The last factor, society's viewing of vigilantism as consistent with
social values, is the most problematic for battered women. While
vigilantism is generally viewed as consistent with social values in the
United States, a 1985 Gallup poll conducted just after the Bernard
Goetz incident showed that seventy-four percent of Americans
believed vigilantism was "sometimes" justified while another eight
percent believed it was "always" justified.66 The battered woman,
however, has not gained the same popular support.6 This paper
argues that she should. The battered woman who kills her abuser
should be seen as a spontaneous vigilante, a defender ofjustice, one
repairing the moral order where the state has failed to do so.
B. Why Must the Batterer's Punishment Be Death?
To some, the death of the abuser may seem an inappropriate or
excessive way for the battered woman vigilante to punish her abuser
and repair the social order. Deadly force on the part of the battered
woman, however, may be justified in several ways. First, death may be
necessary because lesser degrees of force may be insufficient. The
battered woman may not be able to confront the batterer without a
62. SeeAiANJAYLINCOLN & MURRAYA. STRAUSS, CRIME AND THE FAMILY 136 (1985) (stating
that in some instances, police do not respond to domestic violence calls at all because the calls
are given low priority with no immediate dispatch of police units). Researchers have found that
between three and ten percent of domestic violence calls culminate in arrest; the arrests typically
occur after the abuser has been disrespectful to the police officer or has in some way challenged
the officer's authority. Id.; DEBORAH L. RHODEJUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 239 (1989) (stating that one-third of police calls are related to domestic violence,
roughly one-third of police injuries are inflicted in such disputes and less than two percent of
police training hours are devoted to the problem of domestic violence).
63. See Brott, supra note 4 (noting that the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
presents the shocking figure that women who leave their batterers increase their chance of
getting killed by 75%. The Coalition admits this figure is an estimate with no concrete evidence
to back it up).
64. See Cynthia Bowman, Spouse Abuse: A Disparity of Power, CFI. ThIn., June 23, 1994, at 27
(explaining that few batterers are ever sentenced to prison).
65. Id (reporting that batterers' sentences typically involve an order of supervision and a
requirement that they seek counseling, in 1989, only 87 defendants of 1,331 convicted in Cook
County were ordered to serve any jail time).
66. Grayson, supra note 47, at 32.
67. Grayson, supra note 47, at 32.
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deadly weapon because of disparities in size, strength or emotional
control. The lower degree of force a woman typically exerts upon a
man may have little or no impact on a physically stronger abuser.
Indeed, a woman's lesser degree of force may only incite a vicious
retaliation by the abuser.
In addition to believing that a lesser degree of force will be
insufficient, many women may believe that leaving is not possible.'
Those that do attempt to leave report that their abusers follow them,
continuing the harassment and violence.69 Thus, if one accepts the
premise advanced by BWS that battered women are, for a variety of
reasons, unable to leave the batterer, and are often weaker than their
abusers, then death may be the only means by which battered women
can escape the abuse.
70
Moreover, the use of deadly force is legally permissible in circum-
stances other than self-defense. In California, for example, deadly
force is permitted by any person, notjust a police officer, if necessary
to apprehend any person for any felony.7 In these situations, a
citizen must also have a reasonable fear that his or her life is in
danger.72  While this law has most often been applied to persons
who have shot intruders entering their homes, such reasoning is
broad enough to include battered women. Battered women should
be seen as apprehending the batterer for committing a felony, the
battery itself.7
8
Finally, death may be justified under a retributive analysis in which
the battered woman is seen as punishing the batterer.74 Regardless
of whether one morally approves of capital punishment, it has been
sanctioned by the Supreme Court and many states.'5 If the battered
68. See New Jersey v. Kelly, 478 A-2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) (discussing the perceptions of
battered women).
69. Bowman, supra note 64 (discussing continued physical, psychological and sexual abuse).
70. See Washington v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 500 (Wash. 1993) (finding it relevant that the
defendant, a battered child, truly, though wrongly, believed that the only way he could stop the
abuse of himself and his mother was by killing his abuser).
71. See Nieson Himmel, Police Say Watch Shop Owner Kills 4th, 5th Suspects, LA TIMEs, Feb.
21, 1992, at B1 (noting that Lance Thomas has killed five men who attempted to rob his watch
shop and all of the killings were deemed justifiable).
72. 1&
73. It may be argued that battered women are morejustified in killing their abusers because
they know their abusers' history of violence. Richard McAdams, Class Discussion at Chicago-
Kent College of Law (Spring, 1994). The typical male vigilante, on the other hand, shoots a
stranger, with no knowledge of his victim's history of violence. Thus, whereas the battered
woman knows that her abuser will be violent again, the vigilante who kills a stranger has no such
knowledge. The battered woman is therefore preventing almost certain future crime. For the
male vigilante, any such prevention is only speculation.
74. See Madden, supra note 9 at 54-56 (discussing the retributive theory ofjustice).
75. SeeWoodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (approving the imposition of the
death penalty in certain cases but holding that North Carolina's mandatory death sentence for
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woman is stepping in where the state has failed, then she should be
permitted to exercise the same powers as those possessed by the state.
While the punishment may not seem to fit the crime, other, less
extreme, forms of punishment or force may not be available to the
battered woman.
Other forms of violence-Lorena Bobbit's maiming, 6 drawing and
quartering and torture-are not permissible under this rationale
because they are not are state-sanctioned punishments. While it may
seem odd to advocate killing and not other forms of force, this is a
decision made by the states and accepted by a large portion of
American society.77 The death of the batterer, therefore, is a
permissible solution for battered women.
C. Vigilantism Justified by Social Contract Theory
Vigilantism as a permissible mode of self-help for battered women
may be justified under social contract theory7" in two ways. First, the
breakdown of the social compact occurs when the state fails in its
obligation to protect the individual. This breakdown justifies the
individual's resort to self-help. Second, women were not part of the
original contract and thus may not be required to adhere to its
obligations.79
Some theorists argue that law and legal systems developed as a
desirable alternative to private justice." Social contractarians, in
particular, argue that the individual, in giving up the norm of private
vengeance, is entitled to the state's protection.8 ' Thus, the "central
first degree murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where the individual
offender's character and record, and the circumstances of the particular offense, were not
considered); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (finding no constitutional violation where
a defendant convicted ofmurder was sentenced to death); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (vacating the imposition of the death penalty in two rape cases and one murder case
committed by mentally deficient defendants, while upholding the overall constitutionality of
capital punishment). See also John Barnes, Capital Punishment Gridlock, INVESTORS BUSINESS
DAILY, Apr. 10, 1995 at Al (discussing the history of capital punishment and noting that it is
permitted in 38 states).
76. See Questions of Malice in the Bobbit Tria, (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 15, 1994,
transcript no. 77) (discussing the legal aspects of the Bobbit case where Lorena Bobbit maimed
her husband, John Wayne Bobbit, after he allegedly raped her).
77. Cf Tom Teepen, Execution at Face Value, ATLANTA CONST., July 11, 1995, at A17
(explaining that while there is enormous support for the death penalty, it is based on abstract
support for abstract offenders).
78. CAROLE PATmAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRAcT 62(1988) (stating that entering into contracts
enhances individual freedom and security).
79. I& at 5-6.
80. Dodge, supra note 44, at 337 (comparing the legal system with private justice and
asserting that the legal system affords better protection).
81. Bill Lawson, Crime, Minoities and the Social Contrac CRIM.JUSTICE ETHICS, Summer 1990,
at 17 (discussing Locke's SEcOND TREATISE which explains, inter alia, the extent of the state's
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claim of contract theory is that contract is the means to secure and
enhance individual freedom."8 2
Under social contract theory, if the state fails in its obligation to
protect citizens, the government is considered dissolved and the
people are entitled to provide for their own protection.8 3  One
philosopher concludes that where the state fails to protect its citizens,
protecting oneself is not considered civil disobedience or vigilan-
tism.' One may extrapolate this premise to conclude that vigilan-
tism is morally justified by the state's failure to uphold its end of the
compact.8 5
If one accepts social contract theory, one accepts that individuals
are members of the state and deserve physical protection.' One
feminist, however, has argued that women are excluded from the
original social contract since only men consented, or were allowed to
consent, to the social compact.87 Social contractarians such as John
Locke and Thomas Hobbes posited that women were a disruptive
influence who could bring about the state's destruction because they
were incapable of a sense of justice.'u Women, therefore, were
subjugated to men since they lacked the capacity, i.e., the sense of
justice, to enter into the social contract, and were thus naturally
subversive of the political order.8 9 Since women are not part of this
social contract, they may not be bound by the contractarian stricture
against self-help."
D. Vigilantism and the Courts
Courts have long been threatened by vigilantism.9 The legal
system, fearing vigilantism, claims that retribution is the objective of
the criminal justice system.92 The Supreme Court, in an opinion
obligations to its citizens).
82. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 62.
83. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 62.
84. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 2.
85. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 18. Hobbes and Locke, however, believed that vigilantism
was one of the reasons people left the state of nature. Id.
86. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 2.
87. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 5-6.
88. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL THEORY 18-21
(1989).
89. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 54, 96.
90. This is not Pateman's conclusion. Indeed, she might very well advocate the opposite
conclusion. Note also that under social contract theory, women were subjugated to their
husbands. A woman who defied her husband in the ultimate manner, by taking his life, would
probably be reviled by contractarians as subversive of all order.
91. PATEMAN, supra note 78, at 54, 96.
92. See Idaho v. Landreth, 798 P.2d 458, 461 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (holding that while
retribution may be unappealing to some, it is essential to an ordered society where citizens are
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supporting capital punishment, stated that the justice system must
express society's outrage at offensive conduct where society asks its
citizens to rely on the justice system rather than resorting to vigilan-
tism.93 The Court continued:
[T]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon the criminal offender
the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law. 4
For the courts, evenhanded distribution ofjustice is paramount in
maintaining the justice system and preventing the arrival of a state of
anarchy wherein normally law-abiding citizens become vigilantes.
9 5
While society may have revoked the individual's right of private
vengeance, when the justice system fails, the individual may still have
a "fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done.., the urge for
retribution."96
The Supreme Court, however, leaves abuse victims without
recourse. While the Court discourages vigilantism, it also holds that
the United States Constitution provides no protection for victims of
abuse:
[N] othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a
limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain
minimal levels of safety and security.
97
expected to rely on the legal system as opposed to self-help to vindicate wrongs).
93. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
94. I& at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
95. Wilcher v. Mississippi, 635 So.2d 789, 801 (Miss. 1993) (Smith, J. dissenting) (noting
that when the judicial system allows cases to linger in a seemingly never-ending path of review
and appeal, some normally law-abiding citizens become vigilantes, taking matters into their own
hands).
96. Renkel v. Alaska, 807 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (citing Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) as offering an analysis of the function of
public trials in Anglo jurisprudence).
97. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(holding that the state had no constitutional duty to protect a child from his father after
receiving reports of possible child abuse). WhenJoshua Deshaney was four years old, his father
beat him severely enough to cause permanent brain damage. The Department of Social Services
vms aware of Joshua's abuse but did nothing to protect him. Id. at 193. In a vigorous and
compassionate dissent, Justice Brennan contended that "inaction can be every bit as abusive of
power as action, that oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores
it." I&. at 212 (Brennan,J. dissenting). Unfortunately forJoshua and all viqims of abuse,Justice
Brennan's word is not the law.
Fall 1995]
154 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 4:141
This absence of any affirmative duty by states to protect individuals
against private violence, makes vigilantism one of the few viable
options for victims of domestic violence.
Stories about battered women are replete with failed appeals to
police, courts, social service agencies, churches, friends and neigh-
bors." Take, for example, Judy McBride, a victim of battering who
repeatedly called the police only to be told that they would not get
involved because hers was a domestic violence case.9" She tried
calling a family therapy organization, but the telephone number was
not in service."'° A Catholic social service group told her to try and
work things out with her husband."' McBride's husband continued
tormenting her after she filed for legal separation." 2 Ultimately,
McBride hired someone to hurt her abuser.'0 3 The abuser was killed
and McBride was sentenced to life in prison without parole.1
°4
The failure of the criminaljustice system, where the state does not
or will not enforce the law, is one reason vigilantism continues to
garner sympathy from contemporary America." 5 One author notes,
"[lthe American tradition has been for citizens to trust themselves
more than they trust the government.""'5 Why then is not this same
sympathy extended to victims of domestic abuse who become
vigilantes?
One answer may be found in vigilantism's uniquely male tradi-
tion."10 Vigilante groups in the nineteenth century were composed
of most of the adult males in the community, with the wealthiest and
98. Cf. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (Conn. 1984) (holding that a
wife's complaint stated a cause of action for violation of her right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment where she showed that the city and police implemented a classification
system affording victims of domestic violence less protection than victims of non-domestic
violence).
99. Sandy Rovner, The Ultimate Conflict: Killing the Abuser; A Woman Convicted in Husband's
Murder Tells Her Side of the Story, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1987, at Z13.
100. Id.
101. 1d.
102. Id. (describing how McBride's husband continued terrorizing her after their separation
by telephoning day and night, following her wherever she went and threatening her and her
children).
103. id. (noting that McBride's friends agreed to hurt her husband, free of charge).
104. Rovner, supra note 99, at Z13 (pointing out that the killer also received a life sentence).
105. See Lenz, supra note 48, at 131 (discussing how dissatisfaction with the administration
ofjustice in the United States has contributed to the maintenance of the American vigilante
tradition).
106. See KOPEL, supra note 45, at 381 (explaining that in a racist society where innocent
citizens are killed, oftentimes by police officers, many citizens end up taking the law into their
own hands).
107. KOPEL, supra note 45 at 324 (citing Richard M. Brown, The American Vigilante Tradition,
in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HisTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVEs 154 (Hugh D. Graham
and Ted R Gurr ed§., 1969) as stating that vigilantism in the United States is a uniquely male
tradition).
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most powerful men as leaders."' Women, who were not part of the
community's civic life, were not members of vigilante groups.0 9 The
modem bias towards the acceptance of the archetypal vigilante as
male may be seen in their portrayal.
E. Junior G-men: The Archetypal Vigilante is Male
The American public sees the vigilante as male."0 This male is a
cartoon superhero who is larger than life, an acceptable myth."'
Vigilantes are the men portrayed in DEATH WISH"
2 and RAMBO,11
movies that assuage feelings of helplessness, fear and rage that the
public harbors towards crime and criminals."' To be acceptable to
the American public, therefore, the vigilante must be a male of
mythic proportions.
Consider Lance Thomas of Los Angeles who has, in separate
instances, killed five men and wounded another who attempted to rob
his watch shop."5 All of the shootings were ruled justifiable." 6
Glued inside the store's display window is a cartoon in which a woman
says "I Like Lance. He reminds me of Wild Bill Hickock" to which her
cartoon friend replies, "Lance IS Wild Bill Hickock."" 7
In New York, Kenny Mendoza was hailed as a hero for killing an
intruder who threatened his pregnant neighbor."' "A lot of people
108. KoPEL, supra note 45, at 324 (noting that much of the coercive force of vigilantes came
from the social and economic status of men). These 19th century vigilante groups began the
"anti-gambling" and "anti-horse-thief' crusades. Persons violating the crusades were subjected
to whippings, hangings and firing squads. Id.
109. See Lenz, supra note 48, at 118 (noting that vigilantism is defined as "a voluntary
association of men professing to supplement the efforts of the police and the courts in
maintaining order, punishing crime, etc." (emphasis added)).
110. KOPEL, supra note 45, at 325 (explaining that most vigilante committees drew their
leaders from the top levels of local society and comprised several hundred members amounting
to a large fraction of the men in the communities).
111. LILLIAN B. RUBIN, QUIET RAGE: BERNIE GOErZ IN A TIME OF MADNESS 79 (1986)
(examining society's supportive reaction to Bernard Goetz who shot four youths on a subway
believing they were about to rob him).
112. DEATIWISH (Paramount 1974) (portraying Charles Bronson as a mild-mannered
businessman who turns into a ruthless vigilante bent on revenge after his wife is killed and his
daughter rendered comatose by a group of street thugs).
113. RAMBO-FIRST BLOOD H (H.B.O. 1985) (depicting Sylvester Stallone as a former Green
Beret sent to Vietnam to aid in the rescue of American G.l.'s still held captive).
114. RUBIN, supra note 111, at 79.
115. Himmel, supra note 71 (noting that nearby store owners claim Thomas boasts that no
robber will ever walk out of his store).
116. Himmel, supra note 71.
117. Mathis Chazanov, Store Owner Kills Robber-Fourth He Has Shot, LA TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991,
at B3. See also Bob Baker, Is It Sdf-Defense? Legal Gray Area Clouds Shootings, LA TIMES, Nov. 15,
1986, at 1 (noting that in California between 1980 and 1986, 464 persons attempting to commit
felonies were killed and these incidents were ruled justifiable homicides).
118. Howard Kurtz, New York's Public Fear, Private Justice; As Violent Crime Surges, More Victims
are Turning on Attackers, WASH. POST, May 5, 1990, at Al.
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wrote me letters saying I did the right thing .... They said they wish
there were more people like me," reported Mendoza.1 9  He was
cleared of any wrong-doing by a grand jury.120
In Arizona, the Sheriff of Maricopa County has amassed an unpaid
force of 2,300 citizens to eradicate crime in southwest Phoenix.
21
The force is mostly white and male.122  The head of the Phoenix
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union criticized the posse as
"a bunch ofjunior G-men who want to be Batman. It's a comic book
version of crime fighting and I'm worried that something bad will
eventually happen."" Arizona State University Professor Dennis
Palumbo was also leery of the program saying that the Sheriff's
methods will do little to reduce crime in the long run. 24 Professor
Palumbo said the Sheriff "is clever politically, but simply feeds the
notion that we must watch our backs and escalates fears."
12
Bernard Goetz, who shot four black youths, alleged muggers, on a
New York subway in December of 1984, is perhaps the most famous
modem vigilante.126 He became a symbol to crime-weary citizens,
a hero who fought back in a dangerous situation.12 7 To his victims
and others, especially those in the black community, Goetz became
a symbol of racist retaliation.2 The media generally portrayed
Goetz as a hero around whom the American public rallied. 29 Yet
initially no one mentioned that two of his victims were shot in the
119. Id.
120. Id (noting that another New York grand jury refused to indict two half-brothers for
killing a thief who robbed their cousin). See alsoJoseph Fried, For 2 Youths, No Indictment in a
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at BI (recounting the half-brothers' argument that they hit
the robber with a metal fence post to detain him until the police arrived).
121. Sheriff Rounds Up a Posse in Arizona, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1994, at N13.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. ld.
125. Id.
126. Nadine Klansky, Note, Bernard Goetj, A Reasonable Man: A Look at New York'sJustification
Defense, 53 BROOK. L REv. 1149, 1153 (1988) (examining the New York Court of Appeals'
analysis of the penal law in the Goetz case and its creation of a hybrid standard which ultimately
combines objective and subjective elements in determining the applicability of the self-defense
justification).
127. See RUBIN, supra note 111, at 9, 74 (explaining how many citizens who were victims of
crime and afraid to walk the streets regarded Goetz as a hero).
128. SeeKlansky, supranote 126, at 1149 n.2 (analyzing the racistsentiments discussed in N.Y.
Justice System Faces Tough Issues In Vigilante Case, 16 CRIM.JUST. NEWSLETTER, at 1 (1985)). Many
contend that had Goetz been black and his victims white, he would have been considered a
villain. However, in 1980, a black man shot two white teenagers who accosted him on the
subway. The jury refused to indict him and all of the charges against him were dropped. Id.
Thus, fears of victimization and sympathy with vigilantes may cross racial boundaries.
129. RUBIN, supra note 111, at 74 (explaining that Goetz was depicted in newspapers and
television as a hero who enjoyed the support of the American public).
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back, that one of them was shot twice and the second bullet caused
permanent paralysis and brain damage."3
A host of charges were originally levied against Goetz, including
attempted murder."' The first grand jury, however, indicted him
only for criminal possession of weapons.3 2 A second grand jury
indicted Goetz on charges of attempted murder, assault, criminal
possession of a weapon and reckless endangerment. 133 Goetz was
eventually convicted only of illegal gun possession, sentenced to one
year in jail and fined $5,000.1'
The district attorney prosecuting Goetz pointed out that "there was
a huge gap between the 'myth' of Goetz as 'an innocent victim of life
in New York' and the 'sad reality that this defendant is a sick
man.'13 5 Goetz, on the other hand, told the court that he felt the
case was really more about the deterioration of society than it was
about him.' 6 The district attorney recognized the myth of Go-
etz. '37 Goetz, on the other hand, saw himself as a superhero: a
defender of society in its time of need."a This myth was the image
promulgated by the media and embraced by a vocal portion of
American society.39
The treatment of male vigilantes stands in stark contrast to that of
vigilante women. One woman who received extensive press coverage,
Ellie Nesler, was at first lauded by the public and press for killing her
130. See RUBIN, supra note 111, at 74, 153, 190 (noting that Goetz shot Darrell Cabey in the
back as he lay wounded, pleading not to be shot. Goetz apparently stated, "you seem to be doing
all right, here's another." Cabey eventually lapsed into a coma from which he emerged
permanently physically and mentally disabled.).
131. Klansky, supra note 126, at 1153.
132. SeeKlansky, supra note 126, at 1153 (noting that Goetz's criminal possession of weapons
charges were issued because Goetz had one gun on the subway and two more guns in his
apartment).
133. RUBIN, supra note 111, at 237. Goetz's case was procedurally complex. The lower court
dismissed charges of attempted murder and assault finding that the district attorney improperly
instructed the jurors on the law of self-defense. While the Appellate Division upheld the lower
court's dismissal, the NewYork Court of Appeals, NewYork's highest court, reversed, reinstating
the entire indictment and holding that neither the prosecutor's erroneous charge nor newly
discovered evidence of perjured testimony required dismissing any of the charges). Klansky,
supra note 126, at 1156.
134. Goetz Senteced, Fined WASH. Pos, Jan. 14, 1989, at A1O.
135. Howard Kurtz, Goetz Sentened to 6 Months for Subway Shootings, WASH. POST, Oct. 20,
1987, at AS.
136. Goetz Sentenced, Fined WASH. POST,Jan. 14, 1989, atA10 (quoting Goetz as stating, "I do
feel this case is really more about the deterioration of society than it is about me. Society needs
to be protected from criminals.").
137. Kurtz, supra note 135.
138. Anita Creamer, Of Thelma, Louise, Lorena, andEllie, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 13,1993,
at SC1 (comparing Goetz's attitude to that of battered women vigilantes).
139. See Kurtz, supra note 135 (discussing how Goetz became a "hero to many in this crime-
weary city").
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son's abuser."4 Nesler shot her son's alleged abuser five times at a
preliminary hearing to decide whether he would stand trial on
molestation charges. 4' At first, she "found herself a local darling
and a beacon for people everywhere besieged by crime and frustrated
at a porous legal system."' She was embraced as a virtuous mother
pushed over the edge.' This image was quickly rejected when it
was discovered that Nesler had a criminal record and methamphet-
amine in her blood at the time of the shooting.'" Ultimately,
Nesler was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years
in pfison.4
Nesler was rejected by the media and the public. She did not fit the
archetypal image of the vigilante. Not only was Nesler a real,
multidimensional human with problems, but she was a female, and as
such, easily toppled from her pedestal. The lesson of Goetz and
Nesler, then, is that mythical men are acceptable as vigilantes and
multidimensional women are not.
Much as the public rejected Nesler as a heroine, so too has it
rejected battered women.'4 Battered women are not seen as super-
heros; rather, they are seen as victims responsible for their own fate.
A feminist view of battered women who kill, however, perceives the
battered woman as a representation of justice. She is Lady Liberty,
ever-vigilant, vanquishing the brutal male, striking a blow for parity
between the sexes. She is avenging herself and society, righting the
moral order and preventing social decay. The American public,
therefore, should extend the same respect and sympathy to the
battered woman vigilante as it does to the archetypal male vigilante.
140. Mark Arax, A Bitter Mom With a Gun Gets Her Deadly Revenge, SEATrLE TIMES, Apr. 13,
1993, at A2 (noting the large amount of support Nesler received from the American public who
regarded her as a heroine for protecting her child from evil). See also Laura Miller, We Like Our
Avenging Angels to be Pure, S.F. EXAMINMER, OCt. 31, 1993, at D3 (describing the media
sensationalism and support Ellie Nesler received from the public).
141. Arax, supra note 140 (describing how Nesler shot her son's alleged abuser after
wimessing the abuser smirk at her son while the boy was vomiting into a plastic bag).
142. Arax, supra note 140.
143. Arax, supra note 140 (explaining that Ellie Nesler was initially regarded as a virtuous
woman).
144. Mark Arax, Gold Country's Heroine Tarnishes, L.L TIMES, May 18, 1993, at A3.
145. Around the Nation, WASH. PoST, Jan. 9, 1994, at A21 (reporting that Nesler, from
Jamestown, California, was found guilty of shooting her son's molester).
146. See generally BROWNE, supra note 14, at 11 (battered women who kill receive harsher
sentences than men who kill their spouses); Madden, supra note 9, at 72 (discussing the public
backlash in Maryland after several battered women were granted clemency).
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E Concerns about Vigilantism Allayed
Vigilantism raises the specter of anarchy, of society run amuck.14 7
As applied to the battered woman, however, vigilantism may be more
palatable because concerns about control, accountability and racism
are not applicable. One concern with vigilantism is the lack of
control over a group's activities." s This concern is not applicable
to a battered woman who will presumably kill only once." As a
one-time offender, she is not likely to form a group whose purpose is
to search out and punish batterers. 150 In fact, most battered women
who kill have no history of prior violent behavior and have far less
extensive criminal records than other women charged with homi-
cides.'
Accountability is another concern for those opposed to vigilan-
tism. 152 Because it is no mystery who killed when a battered woman
kills her abuser, the battered woman will be held socially, if not
criminally, responsible; she does not escape unknown or unacknowl-
edged.'53 Moreover, the battered woman has already been punished
for years by her batterer She will continue to be punished for
killing her abuser in so far as the stigma, guilt and shame will haunt
her for years. 5
147. Korrach, infra note 187, at 143 (outlining the arguments in opposition to an instruction
on jury nullification).
148. Dodge, supra note 44, at 336 (discussing critics' concern that vigilante groups,
specifically street patrols organized to protect homosexual victims of gay-bashing, may roam
around uncontrolled and unmonitored, taking retributive action against aggressors and engaging
in mob-like behavior).
149. Nancy Gibbs, Battered Women and the Courts: An Overiew, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
259, 268 (Karin L. Swisher et al. eds., 1994) (explaining that battered women generally do not
pose a violent threat to others; rather, they reach a breaking point and fight back only against
their abusers).
150. Id.
151. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 19, at 1591 (relying on a study comparing
the criminal records of women who killed their batterers with the criminal records of women
charged with killing persons not classified as abusers).
152. Dodge, supra note 44, at 336 (discussing critics' concern that street-patrol vigilante
groups may act out of rage and ultimately be held unaccountable for their actions).
153. SeeDONALD T. LUNDE, MURDER & MADNESS 10 (1976) (stating that in 85% of decedent-
precipitated interspousal homicides, the wife kills an abusing husband); see also M. DALY & M.
WILSON, HOMICIDE 278 (1988) (stating that "when women kill, their victims are ... most
typically men who have assaulted them.").
154. KOPEL, supra note 45, at 416 (explaining that most domestic homicides take place after
a long history of violent physical abuse).
155. David France, Life After Death: Battered Women Who Kill Their Husbands GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, July 1995, at 110 (depicting the life-stories of women who were convicted of
killing their abusers and explaining that many women feel a sense of shame and regret about
their actions).
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Racial concerns are similarly not applicable to the battered woman
vigilante. While the term vigilantism connotes the lynch mobs of the
South, domestic violence begins and ends with the abuser and the
abused.156 It may be that there are instances where a white woman
kills her black abuser; however, the impetus for most vigilante
behavior is not race but the battered woman's need to save her own
life.'57 Indeed, this proposal may actually help more black women
than white since all-white police forces traditionally ignore black-on-
black violence."5 A black woman may justifiably have less faith in
the police than a white woman and may be morejustified in resorting
to self-help.
Finally, the proposal in this paper would be strictly limited to
battered women and children who kill." 9 It would not extend to
anti-abortion activists who kill abortion providers, to anti-vivisection-
ists or to any others who claim to be defending those who cannot
defend themselves. The key for allowing the vigilantism proposed
herein is that the battered woman knew her victim; that she had
personally suffered years of abuse at his hands; that she therefore
knew there was a real threat of present and/or future violence.
Others who claim to act for society, such as the recently convicted
murderer Paul Hill, do not know and were not personally abused by
their victim. 6' Thus, they could not claim to be a vigilante as
proposed by this paper.
156. SeeLenz, supra note 48, at 118 (explaining that to mostnAmericans, the term vigilantism
means lynching or a modem variation of that practice).
157. Madden, supra note 9, at 57.
158. Norman Lockman, Community Policing Needed by Police, Not VWgilante, WILMINGTON NEWS
JOURNAL, Sept. 8, 1994 at A12.
159. SeeWashington v.Janes, 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993) (holding that testimony on battered
child syndrome was admissible but technically insufficient). Janes involved a seventeen year old
defendant who shot and killed his long-time abuser coming through the front door of their
home. I& at 497. At trial, the defendant presented extensive evidence of the deceased's abusive
behavior and showed that Child Protective Services had been contacted many times but failed
to intervene. I&t at 498-99. The defendant stated that he believed killing his abuser was the only
way to stop the abuse. Id. at 500. The Supreme Court of Washington held that testimony on
battered child syndrome was admissible to prove self-defense and remanded the case to the trial
court ld. at 500.
The defendant inJanes had a technical imminency problem-his abuser was not being abusive
at the time he was shot. Under this paper's proposed regime, however, the defendant would
have been justified as a child vigilante; one who, like the battered woman, was repairing the
social order.
160. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1322 (10th ed. 1993) (defining
vivisection as (1) the cutting of or operation on a living animal, usually for physiological or
pathological investigation; (2) animal experimentation, especially if considered to cause distress
on the subject).
161. SeeMike Clary, Abortion Foe Is Convicted ofBrutal Slayings, LA. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1994, atAl
(discussing Paul Hill's necessity defense). Paul Hill is a former minister convicted of slaying an
abortion clinic doctor and his volunteer escort in Florida. Acting as his own lawyer, Hill argued
that his actions were justified to prevent a greater harm; namely, the killing of fetuses. Xd.
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III. ENCOURAGING JURY NULLIFICATION
There has been a recent increase in popular support for battered
women.1 62  Congress, for example, as part of The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,16 passed the $1.8 billion
Violence Against Women Act." The Violence Against Women Act
has a wide variety of provisions, including an increase in money for
battered women's shelters and other services and a recommendation
that states allow evidence of BWS in criminal trials.I"
In Washington state, a statute was passed to help battered women
who kill their abusers." The statute allows judges to give more
lenient sentences if the killers or their children were continually
abused by their abuser/victim and applies to persons convicted before
and after July of 1989.167 Ironically, four men, but only one woman,
are in a position to benefit from the law because it does not mention
aggravated murder, the charge against many of the women whom the
statute was intended to help."
Similarly, another indicator of popular support, clemency for
battered women who kill their abusers, is on the rise. 69 The
162. Doris Sue Wong, D.A. Pushes Bill to Hdp Abuse Victims Move Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
22, 1994, at 56 (discussing recent legislative support for battered women, particularly in Norfolk
County, Massachusetts where legislators supported a program to provide housing vouchers to
victims of domestic violence in order to supply them with a safe haven from their abusers).
163. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,42 U.S.C.A ch. 136, subch.
III (appropriating funds for several programs designed to aide women who have been victimized
by violence). Appropriations include $6 million to be allocated over three years (1996-98) to
help reduce stalker and domestic violence, as well as $600,000 for fiscal year 1996, to support
programs designed to educate and train judges and court personnel in state courts about
domestic violence and its effects).
164. See Megan Rosenfeld, Mercy for a Cuckolded Killer, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1994, at C1
(explaining that The Act was passed in part to educate judges about domestic violence and its
consequences); see also D on Colburn, Domestic wlence: AMA Prisdent Decries 'A Major Public Health
Problen,' WASH. POST, June 28, 1994, at Z10 (explaining that the funds will be used to help
prosecute, treat and prevent domestic violence).
165. SeeColburn supra note 164 (discussing a bill sponsored by Rep. Connie Morella (R-Md.)
which provides, among other things, funds for training seminars forjudges who are unfamiliar
with or insensitive to violence against women); see also HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION, supra
note 19, at 1595 (explaining that some funding from the Act would be used to provide training
materials to assist defense attorneys and defendants in the use of BWS testimony).
166. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.045(1) (a) (West 1993).
167. See Nancy Montgomery, 'tbused Mates' Law Has Ironic Result, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 22,
1994, at Al (pointing out that while legislators believed between 12 and 25 women inmates
might qualify for hearings under the law, only three actually qualified).
168. 1d (describing how the hearings of two women convicted of aggravated murder were
canceled because the law precludes sentence reductions by anyone for any reason).
169. SeeMadden, supra note 9, at 1 (discussing how, in California, a large number of battered
women in prisons for killing their abusers have petitioned Governor Pete Wilson for pardon or
commutation of their sentences). Clemency is a movementwhereby imprisoned women petition
the governor of the state in which they are incarcerated for pardon or for commutation of their
prison sentences to time already served. Id.
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clemency movement has met with varying degrees of success."' 0 The
first politicians to grant clemency for battered women were Governor
Richard Celeste of Ohio, who granted clemency to twenty-six women,
and Maryland's Governor William Schaefer, who commuted the
sentences of ten women.171 Governor Schaefer recently stated that
the release of every one of these women "has worked out well."172
In California, on the other hand, of the 100 women who sought
early release from Governor Pete Wilson and the Parole Board
because of abuse, only one was granted clemency. 7 She served
eight and a half years for a second degree murder conviction.17 4
Governor Wilson's reaction to the petitions was that a history of abuse
cannot excuse "coldblooded, premeditated murder."'7 5
In Illinois, GovernorJim Edgar recently pardoned four women who
were convicted of killing their abusers. 176 He rejected the clemency
applications of another eight 177  The polarization of opinion on
clemency is evidenced by the statements of two politicians. The
Arizona State Attorney General said, "[t]his is not the normal
situation where a woman can turn to law enforcement and expect
help. A police officer cannot stand guard at your house. It's an
unusual situation in our society where people who are defenseless are
left to fend for themselves."7" But Arizona State Representative
170. See Creno, supra note 1 (noting that several states have chosen to review the cases of
battered women and grant clemency to some).
171. See Creno, supra note 1 (noting that Governor Celeste granted clemency petitions in
December of 1990 and, thereafter, Governor Schaefer reduced the sentences of ten women in
Maryland).
172. See Kent Jenkins, Jr., Morella Bill Would Provide Aid for Defense of Battered Spouses, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 7, 1992, at B3 (describing how Gail Hawkins, a woman who stabbed her abusive
husband and served ten years in prison before her sentence was commuted, has been
successfully employed as a counselor at a battered women's shelter since her release).
173. SeeVirginia Ellis, Battered Wife Who Killed Husband Gets Early Release, LA. TIMES, Aug. 24,
1994, at Al (noting that Brenda Avis endured nearly ten years of severe beatings and mental
abuse, including death threats, which were described to Governor Wilson by family members,
including the batterer's father); see also BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 173, 768 (6th ed. 1991)
(defining pardon as an act of grace from a governing power which mitigates the punishment
the law demands for the offense. A pardon releases the offender from the entire punishment
prescribed whereas clemency results in a lesser punishment for the offense.).
174. Ellis, supra note 173, at Al.
175. Ken Chavez, Battered Women Denied Clemency, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 29, 1993, at Al
(commenting on his denial of clemency to more than a dozen female inmates claiming to be
victims of battered women's syndrome, Governor Wilson said "society simply cannot condone
preventative murder or homicidal self-help").
176. Bowman, supra note 64 (describing the release of four women who suffered years of
severe physical abuse and noting that none of these women had any prior criminal convictions).
177. Bowman, supra note 64.
178. Creno, supra note 1 (discussing a proposal in Arizona to set'up a special board to
review the sentences of battered women who have killed. Of the seven women serving time for
killing their abusers, four were convicted of second degree and three of first degree murder.
Their sentences range from thirteen years to twenty-five years to life.).
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Tom Smith (R) asserts, "I know I'm not a woman, but I have a hard
time understanding someone sitting there year after year and taking
abuse."'79 Clemency is but one response to the problem of battered
women who kill their abusers. It has attracted support in only a few
states' 80 and affects very few women.'' Of the women clemency
does effect, many have already spent considerable time in jail.
Another reaction reflecting the community's sense of morality and
justice-the sense that a battered woman may be morally justified in
killing her abuser-is jury nullification. 2 The power of the jury is
evident in the case of Judy McBride, discussed supra in Section I.
McBride arranged for a friend to 'hurt' her batterer and he was
found stabbed thirty-eight times." A journalist covering the story
said, "[the jury] hated her.. . . They were very unforgiving. They
somehow didn't buy the battered woman thing .... [C] rowds would
be waiting at the courthouse door to yell things like, 'I hope you
hang.'""' In 1982, a jury convicted McBride of conspiracy to kill
her husband and sentenced her to life in prison with no opportunity
for parole.' a Rather than hate, as manifested by this community
through its jury, the justice system should urge compassion for
battered women who kill. Such compassion should be manifested in
the form ofjury nullification.
The Supreme Court observed that "'one of the most important
functions any jury can perform' in exercising its discretion.., is 'to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system.""86 Jury nullification is "not a 'defense' recognized
179. Creno, supra note 1.
180. See Madden, supra note 9, at 5 n.14 (stating that clemency has been considered for
battered women in Ohio, Maryland, Illinois, Florida, Texas, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
York, Iowa, Washington, Nebraska, Louisiana, Tennessee, California and NewJersey).
181. Madden, supra note 9, at 6.
182. See Barnet, supra note 12, at 40 (defining jury nullification as the power of ajury in a
criminal trial to judge the facts of a case and the propriety of applying the law set forth by the
court); see also Korrach, infra note 187, at 131 (definingjury nullification). Jury nullification
originated in England in 1544 when Sir Nicholas Throckmorten, charged with high treason, was
acquitted by the jury. Id. at 133. In the United States, jury nullification was common during
the early nineteenth century in prosecutions for seditious statements. Jury nullification also
proved to be an important tool for abolitionists in antebellum America. Id. at 134.
183. Rovner, supra note 16 (noting that McBride arranged for a male boarder in her home
to kill her abuser husband).
184. Rovner, supra note 16.
185. Rovner, supra note 16.
186. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois
391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)). The Woodson court noted that "American juries have persistently
refused to convict a significant portion of persons charged with first degree murder of that
offense under mandatory death penalty statutes." Id. at 302. The Court cited Witherspoon to
demonstrate that even juries with sentencing discretion do not impose the death penalty with
great frequency in first degree murder cases. Id. at 295.
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by the law, but is rather a mechanism by which a jury, acting as the
community conscience, effectively is permitted to disregard the letter
of the law by determining that applying it to a particular case would
not be justified."'8 7
Juries, while finding that a defendant is technically guilty, may
nonetheless refuse to convict. For example, jurors may be willing to
regard acts that are excessive or punitive as self-defense. 188 Some
call this an expansive view of self-defense, others call it the popular
acceptance of vigilantism." 9 Whatever the label, juries should be
encouraged to refuse to convict when law and justice conflict. That
is, they should be encouraged to refuse to convict a battered woman
who kills her batterer, especially when BWS evidence and self-defense
are unavailable to the defendant.
One problem with jury nullification is thatjuries do not know that
they have the power to reject the law as unjust." ° While jury
nullification is both a common law and a Constitutional right,'9'
only Maryland and Indiana instruct the jury that it is free to reject the
judge's advice on the law.192 Proponents of a jury nullification
instruction argue that "failing to inform the jury of its power to nullify
usurps its basic function-that is, to serve as the conscience of the
community and to safeguard the individual citizen from unfair laws
and oppressive prosecutorial practices."' Critics of nullification, on
the other hand, contend that a nullification instruction would lead to
chaos and anarchy.194
187. Robert E. Korrach & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullifwation: A Call For Justice or an
Invitation to Anarchy, 139 MILrARY L. REv. 131 (1993) (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473
F.2d 1113, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1972) as holding that refusal to instruct the jury of its right to acquit
without regard to the law and evidence was not improper).
188. Grayson, supra note 4, at 24 (drawing on the Goetz incident as an example of an
excessive act defined by the jury as self-defense).
189. Grayson, supra note 47, at 24.
190. Korrach, supra note 187, at 131.
191. Todd Bamet, New York Considers Jury Nullifcation: Informing the Jury of its Common Law
Right to Decide Both Facts and Law, 65 N.Y. STATE BARJ. 40 (1993) (arguing that juries should be
informed of their nullification power).
192. Korrach, supra note 187, at 139 n.58 (referring to V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE
Juov 21, 157 1986) which states thatjudges in Maryland and Indiana instruct the jury that it is
free to reject the judge's advice on the law). But see Walker v. Indiana, 445 N.E.2d 571 (Ind.
1983) (holding that a jury does not possess the power of nullification under the laws of
Indiana).
193. Korrach, supra note 187, at 139 n.58.
194. Korrach, supra note 187, at 143 (citing California v. Fernandez, 26 Cal. App. 4th 710,
715 (1994) which held that the trial court was not required to advise the jury of its power to
nullify, and stating- "to give every juror the option of disregarding with impunity any law
personally judged morally untenable is akin to telling all drivers to drive as fast as they think
appropriate without posting a limit as a departure. It risks, if not chaos, at least caprice.").
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Fears of juries running rampant are excessive. When carefully
instructed, a jury should still act reasonably and with full respect for
the law and its own power.9 5 Courts should have faith in a jury's
"sense of justice."'9 6 Faith in the jury reflects that the jury is the
final arbiter ofjustice, that the "law, in the last analysis, must reflect
the general community sense of justice." 97
One alternative for those who worry that a nullification instruction
would carry the judge's imprimatur and consequently great weight
with the jury, is permitting attorneys to argue nullification in closing
arguments. 9 ' Most courts, believing it to be a threat to the law, do
not permit attorneys to encourage juries to violate their oaths to
follow a court's instructions.'99 Technically, however, attorneys are
allowed to argue both the evidence and any conclusions to be drawn
from the evidence. °0 One conclusion logically drawn from the
evidence may be that convicting the defendant would be unjust20 '
Moreover, if the right of jury nullification is part of the law, then
attorneys should be able to argue it. In other words, they should not
be restricted to arguing only the law of the crime with which their
client is charged. 22 Whether in the form of an instruction from the
judge or an attorney's closing argumentjuries should be informed of
their nullification power, especially in cases where battered women
have killed their abusers. While a battered woman may have technical-
ly violated the law, the jury should be permitted to reflect the
195. SeeKorrach, supra note 187, at 139 n.56 (citing Kansas' former Pattern Instruction 51.03
which stated: " [ a]ccordingly, you are entitled to act upon your conscientious feeling about what
is a fair result in this case and acquit the defendant if you believe that justice requires such a
result. Exercise your judgment without passion or prejudice, but with honesty and understand-
ing. Give respectful regard to my statements of the law for what help they may be in arriving at
a conscientious determination ofjustice in this case. That is your highest duty as a public body
and as officers of this court.").
196. See New Jersey v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1181 (NJ. 1994) (reflecting the court's
faith in the jury's ability to understand and apply a portion of a strict liability statute which held
manufacturers and distributors of certain dangerous controlled substances strictly liable when
death resulted from ingestion of those substances).
197. Id at 1181 (quoting Frances B. Sayre, Pub&ic Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 70
(1933)).
198. See Korrach, supra note 187, at 148 (describing cases wherein defense counsel appealed
to the jury in closing to ignore the judge's instructions and use their conscience and
understanding in judging the defendant).
199. Korrach, supra note 187, at n.116 (citing United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102 (11th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Childress, 746 F. Supp. 1122 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Renfroe, 634 F. Supp. 1536 (W.D.
Pa. 1986)).
200. Korrach, supra note 187, at 149 (citing MODERN CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
DR 7-106(C)(4) and 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial Sec. 632, at 233-34 (1991) as standing for the
proposition that during closing argument counsel may argue any inferences logically drawn from
the evidence).
201. Korrach, supra note 187, at 149.
202. Korrach, supra note 187, at 149.
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
community's conscience and the possible belief that the battered
woman may have been morally justified in her action. This is not to
say that all juries must absolve all battered women who kill. Rather,
juries must be informed of, and allowed to exercise, their prerogative
to choose justice over the law.
Encouraging jury nullification for battered women is not a radical
proposal. Indeed, there are signs that juries have been more lenient
with victims of abuse.03° The justice system, however, through
instruction or argument to the jury, should encourage juries to act as
the moral reflection of the community and acquit battered women
who kill.
IV. CONCLUSION
Carole Herriman's story, mentioned at the beginning of this paper,
would have ended differently had the jury been allowed to nullify the
law. Instead of serving a twenty-five year to life sentence for killing
the man who terrorized her for years, she would have been acquitted
by the jury. Rather than being judged a villain, Herriman would have
been perceived as a vigilante punishing a deserving felon.
If one is worried that the preceding suggestions will cause large
numbers of women to "get-off," it is important to note that fewer than
one percent of women surveyed in a Harris Poll claimed to have been
beaten up, much less choked or threatened by their partners with a
weapon."° Thus, the number of people affected by extreme
violence, the type of violence that leads women to kill their abusers,
may not be very high. But just because the numbers may be relatively
low does not mean the problem is not severe and a solution is not
important for the women who are the victims of vicious abuse. Thus,
in the exceptional instances where a battered woman kills her abuser
and BWS evidence is somehow legally insufficient, the jury, as a
reflection of the community's sense of morality and outrage, should
be encouraged to acquit.
203. Kon-ach, supra note 187, at 148 n.14 (citing Courtroom Putsch? Jurors Should Reject Laws
They Don't Like, Activist Group Argues, WAU ST. J., Jan. 4, 1991, at 4, which describes the beliefs
of the Fully Informed Jury Association, an organization advocating the practice of informing
juries about their rights to disregard the law).
204. See Brott, supra note 4 (arguing that statistics regarding wife abuse are greatly
exaggerated and used irresponsibly, and citing The National Family Violence Survey, which
found that of the sixteen percent of families that do experience violence, only three to four
percent engage in severe violence).
[Vol. 4:141
